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Abstract
Motivated by debates surrounding international capital flows during the Great Reces-
sion, we conduct a positive and normative analysis of capital flows when a region of the
global economy experiences a liquidity trap. Capital flows reduce inefficient output fluc-
tuations in this region by inducing exchange rate movements that reallocate expenditure
towards the goods it produces. Restricting capital mobility hampers such an adjustment.
From a global perspective, constrained efficiency entails subsidizing capital flows to ad-
dress an aggregate demand externality associated with exchange rate movements. Absent
cooperation, however, dynamic terms-of-trade manipulation motives drive countries to
inefficiently restrict capital flows, impeding aggregate demand stabilization.
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1 Introduction
Following the global financial crisis, a large number of advanced economies (including the U.S.,
the U.K., and the Eurozone) entered a period of anemic economic activity and very low interest
rates that resembled a liquidity trap. At the same time, the crisis marked a break in a trend of
widening current account imbalances that had been a central feature of the global economy for
the previous two decades. After the crisis, on the deficit side, the U.S. experienced an increase its
savings rate and a significant reduction in its current account deficit. Meanwhile, on the surplus
side, many emerging market economies experienced a surge in capital inflows and a deterioration
of their current account position.1 Some observers and policymakers at the time argued that
this incipient unwinding of global imbalances could promote a rebalancing of demand across
countries and help facilitate a swifter global recovery (Blanchard, 2009, Blanchard and Milesi-
Ferretti, 2009, IMF, 2010). This rebalancing was to crucially rely on the willingness of surplus
countries to allow more capital inflows, let their currency appreciate, and thus suffer a loss in
external competitiveness (Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti, 2012). Fearing such prospects, several
emerging market countries, likely emboldened by a shift in the stance of multilateral institutions
that broke with the Washington consensus view (see Ostry et al., 2010, 2011 and IMF, 2012),
adopted forms of capital controls to put the brakes on inflows, with some apparent success
(Ahmed and Zlate, 2014).
This narrative raises several questions regarding the foundations and multilateral aspects of
capital flow management policies in a liquidity trap. What precise role do capital flows play
in global macroeconomic adjustment at the zero lower bound (ZLB)? Do they fulfill this role
efficiently, or are capital flow management policies warranted? Are such policies associated with
adverse spillover effects? Is coordinating such policies more crucial than in normal times? If so,
why? Our goal in this paper is to address these questions.
To this end, we use a general equilibrium two-country model of the world economy in the New
Open Economy Macroeconomics tradition, featuring imperfect competition, nominal rigidities,
and an explicit zero bound on nominal interest rates. With the global economy’s experience
of the Great Recession in mind, we interpret Home as the set of advanced economies and
Foreign as the set of emerging economies. In line with the recent literature on policy at the
zero lower bound, we consider a large unanticipated negative shock to the home discount rate (a
negative “demand” shock) that pushes Home, but not Foreign, into a liquidity trap, defined as a
situation where the “natural rate” turns negative.2 Assuming that monetary policy is conducted
1This capital inflows surge followed a brief sudden stop in the last quarter of 2008. See Jeanne et al. (2012)
for a detailed description of capital flow patterns during this period.
2 The natural rate is defined as the real interest rate prevailing in an equilibrium with flexible prices and
exchange rates, under appropriately specified production subsidies that eliminate monopolistic competition dis-
tortions.
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optimally, we then compare the global macroeconomic adjustment to the shock under a variety
of capital flow regimes.
Three results emerge from our analysis. (i) In a liquidity trap, capital flows help reduce
inefficient output fluctuations by decoupling output dynamics from consumption dynamics.
Capital flows facilitate this decoupling by generating exchange rate movements that promote
expenditure switching in favor of the goods whose provision is the most depressed. (ii) At the
ZLB, even a regime of free capital mobility is constrained inefficient. Constrained efficiency calls
for subsidizing capital flows, so as to encourage even more decoupling and expenditure switching.
Thus, in a liquidity trap, managing capital flows has the potential to increase global welfare.
(iii) Despite the desirability of capital account interventions in a liquidity trap, uncoordinated
capital flow management policies are not generally warranted. The reason is that dynamic
terms-of-trade manipulation incentives partly driving these policies work against macroeconomic
stabilization.
To build intuition on the role of capital flows in a liquidity trap, consider the case of a closed
economy. When a discount rate shock results in a negative natural rate, monetary policy is
constrained by the zero bound. This results in an excessively high real interest rate and output
must fall below its efficient level on impact in order to eliminate excess supply of savings.3
Optimal monetary policy, by committing to keep interest rates at zero past the liquidity trap
episode, can engineer a future boom and thereby dissipate excess demand for current savings
without as large a fall in output (Eggertsson and Woodford, 2003, Werning, 2012).
In an open economy context, excess savings can be channeled to other economies, which can
further limit the initial output drop. The strength of this equilibrating force, however, crucially
depends on the degree of capital mobility. Under free capital mobility, the adjustment features
large trade imbalances: a more patient Home initially runs a trade surplus and accumulates
claims vis-à-vis Foreign. Meanwhile, a negative interest rate differential between Home, for
which the ZLB binds, and Foreign, for which it does not, induces a continuous appreciation
of the home currency, following a depreciation on impact. This exchange rate response helps
redirect expenditure in favor of the Home good early in the liquidity trap, precisely at the time
when its provision is the most depressed. In contrast, under closed capital accounts—much
like the closed economy—Home’s excess savings cannot be channeled to Foreign. Furthermore,
close capital accounts preclude the stabilizing exchange rate movements that occured under
free capital mobility. Dissipating excess savings in Home requires home output to fall more
on impact. Thus, curtailing capital mobility reduces the potency of the equilibrating force
associated with openness.
Next, we investigate whether a regime of free capital mobility fulfills the stabilizing role
described above efficiently. To this end, we formulate a planning problem in which a global
3This is often referred to as a “demand-driven recession.”
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planner chooses a path of taxes or subsidies on capital flows to maximize world welfare. We
find that while a regime of free capital mobility is constrained efficient when away from the zero
bound, it is constrained inefficient when a region of the world economy faces a binding ZLB.
In the same way that the real interest rate is excessively high in a closed economy liquidity
trap, under free capital mobility the home real exchange rate is also excessively appreciated.
The constrained inefficiency of the free capital mobility regime can hence be traced back to an
aggregate demand externality resulting from the combination of two factors: output is demand
determined and monetary policy is constrained by the zero bound in Home. Atomistic agents
do not internalize that their savings decisions lead to adjustments in both inter- and intra-
temporal prices. In the presence of nominal rigidities, however, such price adjustments aren’t
always feasible and quantity adjustments are instead required, resulting in aggregate demand
externalities associated with private decisions. Away from the ZLB, optimal monetary policy
is able to address this externality. However, at the ZLB it is unable to do so, and capital flow
management policy can serve as a useful complement.
We provide a sharp analytical characterization of the constrained efficient capital flow regime,
including a closed form expression for the optimal tax wedge on capital flows. During the liquid-
ity trap, this regime entails a subsidy on flows from Home to Foreign and smaller fluctuations in
the home output gap.4 The managed regime also features a steeper exchange rate path, and a
more expansionary foreign monetary policy stance during the liquidity trap. Intuitively, capital
flow taxes allow exchange rate dynamics to decouple from interest rate differentials, and thereby
relax the ZLB constraint in Home without inflicting much harm on Foreign, for whom monetary
policy can adjust.
While our result stands in contrast to the findings of Devereux and Yetman (2014) that
capital flow taxes are not desirable in a liquidity trap, the optimal tax formula we derive allows
us to reconcile the two views. It shows that a free capital mobility regime is only constrained
efficient in knife-edge cases where natural interest rates are equal across countries, the scenario
Devereux and Yetman focus on exclusively. Our optimal tax formula also helps distinguish our
results from the work of Farhi and Werning (2016), whose general prescription is that optimal
financial market taxes should redirect purchasing power toward agents with the highest marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) on goods whose provision is relatively more depressed. In fact,
our model’s prescription entails discouraging spending by home agents at the precise time when
the provision of the home good (on which they have a higher MPC) is the most depressed (i.e.,
early in the liquidity trap). The reason is that such a diversion supports an exchange rate
trajectory that induces all agents to redirect expenditure toward the home good at that time.
This, in our view, emphasizes the fundamental role of the exchange rate regime in determining
4We define the output gap at any date t as the difference between the level of output and its efficient level at
the same date. For more details on the path of output under the efficient benchmark, see Section 2.6.
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the direction of the inefficiency on capital flows in a liquidity trap.
At first glance, our finding that capital does not flow sufficiently in a liquidity trap may
seem difficult to reconcile with a recent literature on capital flow management that argues
that free capital flows might instead be excessively volatile (see our literature review below).
This literature, however, studies capital flow management from the perspective of individual
inflow recipient countries, whereas we take a global efficiency standpoint. To illustrate that
this distinction is crucial, we also consider a setting where countries manage capital flows non-
cooperatively. In this case, we show that the incentives of individual countries to alter capital
flows also respond to a desire to manage their dynamic terms-of-trade (dToT), as in Costinot
et al. (2014).5 We show that this dToT manipulation motive leads countries to restrict capital
flows and thus conflicts with macroeconomic stabilization in a liquidity trap. Furthermore,
for commonly used parameterizations of this model, the dToT manipulation motive can easily
dominate the macroeconomic stabilization force in a Nash equilibrium where countries manage
their capital account non-cooperatively. In such cases, output gap fluctuations are larger, not
only than under the efficient regime, but also than under free capital mobility. This result
resonates with the argument in Blanchard and Milesi-Ferretti (2012) that adverse spillover
effects of capital controls by recipient countries may be particularly severe in a liquidity trap,
and provides a theoretical underpinning for efforts to better coordinate capital flow management
policies across countries during such episodes (see IMF, 2011, Ostry et al., 2012).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We conclude the introduction with a review
of the related literature. We then describe the model in Section 2. Section 3 highlights the role
of capital flows at the zero bound, Section 4 analyzes capital flow efficiency, Section 5 studies
non-cooperative capital flow management, Section 6 discusses potential extensions, and Section
7 concludes.
Related literature The paper relates to a large body of literature on the conduct of mone-
tary policy in liquidity traps that has developed following the seminal work of Krugman (1998)
and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003).6 In the open economy context, the literature has mainly
emphasized spillovers and interdependence of monetary policy across countries (Jeanne, 2009,
Haberis and Lipinska, 2012, Cook and Devereux, 2013, Fujiwara et al., 2013). By using Cole
and Obstfeld (1991) preferences, we intentionally abstract from such monetary policy spillovers,
and instead focus on the role played by capital mobility in shaping the dynamics of key macro
variables in a liquidity trap. Nevertheless, we provide along the way a first analytical char-
5This motive arises in every open economy model where countries have some degree of market power over a
good they trade. It applies to capital exporters and importers alike, and prevails independently from zero lower
bound considerations.
6See, for instance, Eggertsson and Woodford (2004b,a), Eggertsson (2006, 2010), Christiano et al. (2011),
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), Werning (2012), Correia et al. (2013), and
Benigno and Fornaro (2015).
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acterization of the optimal ZLB exit time in an open economy, extending the closed economy
analysis of Werning (2012). Our focus on capital mobility is thus similar to that of Devereux and
Yetman (2014), although unlike us they argue that capital controls are not desirable in terms
of welfare in a liquidity trap. As mentioned above, we are able to clarify that their result only
holds in knife-edge cases where natural interest rates happen to be equal across countries. From
an optimal policy perspective, our analysis highlights the role of capital flow taxes/subsidies
as an additional tool to overcome the limitations of monetary policy at the ZLB.7 By analyti-
cally characterizing and comparing cooperative and non-cooperative capital flow management
regimes, we further uncover a key source of distortion associated with non-cooperativeness and
point to the importance of international cooperation during liquidity trap episodes.
Our paper also connects to a wealth of literature on capital flow regulation in emerging
market economies. Several recent papers have developed arguments in favor of capital account
interventions based on imperfections in financial markets (e.g., Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001), Korinek (2007, 2010), Jeanne and Korinek (2010), Bianchi (2011)).8 Others have shown
that imperfections in goods markets may also provide a rationale for the use of capital controls.
DePaoli and Lipinska (2012) and Costinot et al. (2014) emphasize the role of market power and
dynamic terms of trade management. Farhi and Werning (2012, 2014) and Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2016) stress the role of nominal rigidities. All these papers study optimal capital flow
management from the perspective of individual countries. In contrast, we study the desirability
of managing capital flows from a global efficiency perspective and highlight how such a regime
differs from one where individual countries manage capital flows non-cooperatively.
More generally, our work also speaks to a recent literature on optimal policy interventions
in economies with aggregate demand externalities (see, for example, Farhi and Werning, 2012,
Farhi and Werning, forthcoming and Korinek and Simsek, 2016). While our approach shares
several features with this work, our findings stand out from its general message that optimal
policy should induce agents with higher MPC on goods that are relatively depressed in some
states to tilt their wealth toward these states (Farhi and Werning, 2016).
Finally, the paper also relates to contemporaneous work by Caballero et al. (2015) (CFG),
Eggertson et al. (2016) (EMSS) and Fornaro and Romei (2016). Like us, these authors study
the interplay between international capital flows and liquidity traps. However, the focus of
CFG and EMSS is on the steady state analysis of permanent liquidity traps resulting in secular
stagnation, while we emphasize transitional dynamics during temporary liquidity trap episodes.
As a result, while interest rate policy is permanently impotent in their frameworks, it remains
7Korinek (2014) (section 5.2) also briefly analyzes the use of capital flow taxes at the ZLB but does so only
from the point of view of a small open economy.
8Gabaix and Maggiori (2015) also show that in the presence of financial frictions, capital controls can increase
the potency of currency market interventions as a tool to combat exchange rate movements generated by financial
turmoil.
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a key determinant of the short-run dynamics in our analysis through forward guidance. With
respect to dealing with the multilateral effects of using tools other than monetary policy in a
liquidity trap, our papers are complementary: while CFG and EMSS emphasize public debt
issuance and fiscal policy, we focus on capital flow management policy and, in particular, the
conflict arising between the dictates of global efficiency and the incentives of individual countries
in that regard. Our analysis also shares similarities with Fornaro and Romei (2016). Like us,
they consider the use of taxes on financial transactions to deal with liquidity traps in an open
economy setting, and contrast non-cooperative with cooperative outcomes. However, while we
contemplate the ex-post use of these policies for stimulatory purposes, they consider them from
an ex-ante precautionary standpoint.
2 Model
The world economy consists of two equally sized countries, labeled “Home” and “Foreign.”9 In
each country, households consume goods and supply labor, while firms hire labor to produce
output. Foreign variables are denoted with asterisks. Following a large body of literature,
we adopt the Cole and Obstfeld (1991) parameterization which features unitary inter- and
intra-temporal elasticities of substitution. As we shall see, this parameterization eliminates
international spillovers from monetary policy (see, e.g., Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001) and allows
us to streamline the role of capital flow regimes. The model is deterministic, and a liquidity
trap is generated using a time-varying discount rate for Home.
2.1 Households













where Ct is consumption, Nt is labor supply, φ is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply,
ρ is the (steady state) discount rate and ζt is a time-varying and country-specific discount rate
shifter. Although our model does not feature uncertainty (as of date 0), we will refer to a
negative realization of ζt as a negative demand shock, as such a realization lowers the demand
for current consumption relative to future consumption (and hence increases the desire to save).
9In the context of the Great Recession, we think of Home as representing the set of demand deficient economies
and of Foreign as standing for the rest of the world.
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is an index of foreign produced varieties, and α ∈ (0, 0.5] is a home bias
parameter representing the degree of openness.
Households have access to markets for bonds issued under home and foreign jurisdiction,
but they potentially face taxes for investing abroad. Home bonds are denominated in home
currency, and foreign bonds are denominated in foreign currency. Since the model does not
feature uncertainty, each of the two bonds trivially spans the space of states of nature. The
home household’s budget constraint is given by
ḊH,t + EtḊF,t = itDH,t + (i∗t + τt − τ ∗t ) EtDF,t +WtNt + Tt + Πt −
∫ 1
0




PF,t (l)CF,t (l) dl (1)
where DH,t denotes home currency bond holdings, DF,t denotes foreign currency bond holdings,
Et is the nominal exchange rate (the price of the foreign currency in terms of the home currency),
Wt is the nominal wage, Tt denotes a lump-sum transfer and Πt denotes the payout of domestic
firms. We explicitly allow for taxes and subsidies on capital flows: τt is a tax on capital inflows
(or a subsidy on capital outflows) in Home, and similarly τ ∗t is a tax on capital inflows (or a
subsidy on capital outflows) in Foreign.10 The proceeds of these taxes are rebated lump sum to
domestic households.
Expenditure minimization leads to a home consumer price index (CPI) defined as Pt ≡
(PH,t)
1−α (PF,t)















is Home’s price index of imported goods.11 The household’s demand
for a differentiated good l is given by Cj,t(l) = (Pj,t(l)/Pj,t)
−εCj,t, for j = H,F . The law of
one price (LOP) implies Pj,t (l) = EtP ∗j,t (l) for j = H,F . At the final good level, it implies
10A more sophisticated capital flow tax system could feature independent tax rates for inflows and outflows.
It would potentially give rise to corner solutions and no-trade equilibria for non-singleton sets of exogenous
variables and taxes, thus significantly complicating the analysis. For this reason, we follow the vast majority of
the normative literature on capital flow management in assuming that for each country, the tax rate on outflows
is constrained to be equal to minus the tax rate on inflows.























being Foreign’s price index of imported goods.
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Pj,t = EtP ∗j,t for j = H,F . The terms-of-trade between Home and Foreign are defined as the
relative price of the foreign index St ≡ PF,t/PH,t = EtP ∗F,t/PH,t, while the real exchange rate is
defined as the ratio of CPIs: Qt ≡ EtP ∗t /Pt.
The home household chooses consumption, labor supply and bond holdings to maximize
utility. His optimal labor supply condition is given by Wt/Pt = N
φ
t Ct, and his Euler equation
for the home and foreign currency bond holdings are given by
Ċt
Ct
= it − πt − (ρ+ ζt), (2)
Ċt
Ct
= i∗t + τt − τ ∗t +
Ėt
Et
− πt − (ρ+ ζt).
where πt ≡ Ṗt/Pt is home CPI inflation. The combination of these two Euler equations implies
a distorted interest parity condition it = i
∗
t + τt − τ ∗t + ĖtEt . Foreign households are symmetric.
Their preferences, constraints and optimality conditions are laid out in online Appendix C.2.
2.2 Firms
Technology Firms in Home and Foreign produce differentiated goods l ∈ [0, 1] with a linear
technology: Yt(l) = ANt(l), resp. Y
∗
t (l) = A
∗Nt(l). Without loss of generality and to streamline
the notation, we set the level of productivity in both countries to A = A∗ = 1.
Price setting We assume that the price of each variety is fully rigid, and normalize this price
to 1. As a result, the producer price index (PPI) of both countries in their own currencies







Furthermore, the real exchange rate is related to the terms-of-trade by Qt = S
1−2α
t , and the
terms-of-trade coincide with the nominal exchange rate: St = Et. The assumption of fully rigid
prices can be regarded as an extreme one, but it has the virtue of significantly improving the
analytical tractability of the model and making our results transparent.12
2.3 Government
Each country’s government transfers lump-sum the proceeds from capital flow taxes to the




12Rigid prices rule out PPI inflation or deflation, but do not eliminate the deflation-recession feedback loop
that is a key characteristic of liquidity trap episodes. This is because the relevant measure for that mechanism is
CPI inflation rather than PPI inflation, and CPI inflation does respond to fluctuations in the nominal exchange
rate. We discuss the consequences of relaxing this rigid price assumption in Section 6.
8
2.4 Equilibrium
International “risk”-sharing Combining the home and foreign households’ Euler equations
for the home bond, it is possible to derive an international consumption smoothing condition




where Θt ≡ Θ0 exp
[∫ t
0
(ζ∗s − ζs + τs − τ ∗s ) ds
]
. Θ0 is a constant related to initial relative wealth
positions. Absent preference shocks and capital flow taxes, (3) would indicate a constant ratio
of marginal utilities out of nominal income in both countries. Given our logarithmic utility
assumption, this translates into the ratio of home expenditure to foreign expenditure being
equal to a constant (i.e., PtCt = EtP ∗t C∗t , as Qt = EtP ∗t /Pt). Preference shock and capital flow
taxes, however, make this expenditure ratio time-varying, following a law of motion given by
Θ̇t
Θt
= ζ∗t − ζt + τt − τ ∗t (4)
Under free capital mobility (i.e., τt−τ ∗t = 0), a scenario where ζ∗t −ζt > 0 features a relatively
more patient home agent who experiences a shrinking trade deficit (or growing trade surplus)
and sees its expenditure ratio rise over time: Θ̇t/Θt > 0. By lending to the foreign agent,
the home agent is able to postpone consumption to when it values it relatively more. In this
context, the imposition of a (mild) tax on capital inflows by Foreign (i.e., τ ∗t > 0) discourages
capital flows from Home into Foreign, leading to smoother trade imbalances and a smoother
expenditure ratio (i.e., it makes Θ̇t/Θt less positive).
Market clearing In equilibrium, bond markets, goods markets and labor markets all have to
clear. Market clearing requires DH,t+D
∗
H,t = 0 for the home currency bond, and DF,t+D
∗
F,t = 0
for the foreign currency bond.14 Equilibrium in the market for each good l in Home implies that








, is given by15
Yt = (1− α)Sαt Ct + αSαt QtC∗t . (5)
13In models featuring uncertainty and complete markets, this condition is often labeled as an international
risk-sharing condition. We therefore refer to this condition accordingly, even though risk is absent from our
model. (3) is a (potentially distorted) version of what is commonly referred to as the Backus-Smith condition
(see Kollmann (1991) and Backus and Smith (1993)) in which Θt would represent a Pareto weight in a planning
problem. A detailed derivation of (3) is provided in online Appendix C.3.
14Given the redundancy of one of the two bonds, bond portfolios are indeterminate in equilibrium. However,
net foreign asset positions as well as prices and allocations are determinate.
15For a detailed derivation of the home and foreign aggregate goods market clearing conditions, see online
Appendix C.4.
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Similarly, market clearing for each good in Foreign requires foreign aggregate output to be given
by
Y ∗t = (1− α)S−αt C∗t + αS−αt Q−1t Ct. (6)















The above equilibrium conditions can be combined in a way that greatly simplifies the
structure of the optimal policy problems we consider in the next sections. Combining the home
and foreign aggregate market clearing conditions (5) and (6) with the international “risk”-
sharing condition (3) and the equation linking the real exchange rate to the terms-of-trade,
Qt = S
1−2α








αΘ−1t + 1− α
)−(1−α)








αΘ−1t + 1− α
)−α
(αΘt + 1− α)−(1−α) , (8)
Differentiating these equations with respect to time, and substituting the home Euler equations
(2), its foreign analogue, as well as the laws of motion for the consumption ratio (4) yields
“Euler equations” in terms of output
Ẏt
Yt
= it − (ρ+ ζt)−
α
(1− α) Θt + α
(ζ∗t − ζt + τt − τ ∗t ) (9)
Ẏ ∗t
Y ∗t
= i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘ
(1− α) + αΘt
(ζ∗t − ζt + τt − τ ∗t ) (10)
Lastly, substituting the various equilibrium conditions into the home agent’s budget constraint









s−τ∗s )ds (Θt − 1) dt, (11)
where b0 is Home’s net foreign assets expressed in terms of the foreign agent’s marginal utility.
17
Equations (7)-(11) summarize the optimal decisions of private agents and can therefore
be regarded as implementability conditions. These equations, along with an description of
monetary and capital flow management policy, constitute an equilibrium.
Equations (9)-(10) are non-linear dynamic New-Keynesian IS curves that respectively de-
scribe the path of output in the home and foreign country. These equations relate output
growth to the domestic nominal interest rate, the domestic discount rate and the factors influ-
encing the growth rate of the expenditure ratio. They are among the model’s key equations
16Price dispersion inefficiencies are absent due to our rigid price assumption.
17See online Appendix C.5 for a detailed derivation of this constraint and its analogue for Foreign.
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and contain important information about the international spillovers at work. Crucially, these
equations reveal that home output is independent of foreign monetary policy and vice versa. A
foreign monetary expansion stimulates foreign consumption (through a standard inter-temporal
substitution channel) and therefore stimulates demand for the home good. At the same time,
by generating a home currency appreciation, it switches expenditure (by home and foreign con-
sumers alike) away from the domestic good. As noted by Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) in a related
model, under the joint assumption of unitary intra- and inter-temporal elasticity of substitution,
these two effects exactly cancel out.18 However, the equations reveal that demand shocks and
capital flow taxes do result in international spillovers. For instance, a negative home demand
shock is contractionary for Foreign through its intertemporal substitution effect on home con-
sumption. In addition, a tax on capital inflows by Home induces a current appreciation of the
Home currency, and thus is contractionary for Home but expansionary for Foreign through the
expenditure switching effect.19
2.5 Demand shock episode
Our analysis concerns a liquidity trap episode. To this end, we assume that just before date
t = 0, the world economy is in a symmetric steady state where both countries have zero net
foreign asset positions. Next, as is standard practice in the literature, we generate a liquidity
trap via a large unanticipated temporary demand shock which we model as a transitory decrease
(from date 0 to T ) in the rate of time preference of home households. Formally, the rate of time
preference at Home is ρ+ ζt, where ζt is given by:
ζt =
−ζ for t ∈ [0, T ), with ζ̄ > 00 for t ≥ T
The foreign economy is not hit by a demand shock directly and thus, ζ∗t = 0 ∀t ≥ 0. As our
analysis of Section 3 will make clear, for large enough ζ̄, replicating the efficient allocation will
require negative nominal interest rates in one or both economies up till date T . Therefore, a
monetary authority constrained by the ZLB will fail to achieve the efficient allocation, which
will result in a situation akin to a liquidity trap.20 In the rest of the paper, we refer to the
period between dates 0 and T as the demand shock episode in the Home economy.
18Benigno and Benigno (2003) refer to this case as one where the two economies are “insular.”
19The mechanism is as follows. From the (distorted) interest parity condition, other things being equal,
a positive tax requires an expected appreciation of the home currency vis-à-vis the foreign currency. This
expected appreciation of the home currency leads to an expected improvement of the foreign terms-of-trade, and
accordingly to an expected deterioration of the home terms-of-trade. This shifts current expenditure toward
the home good and away from the foreign good. Note that a positive effect on output growth indicates a
contractionary effect, while a negative effect on output growth indicates an expansionary effect.
20We refer the reader to Section 3 for a formal definition of a liquidity trap in our model.
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2.6 Socially optimal allocation
A natural way to assess the desirability of decentralized outcomes is to compare these with
a socially optimal allocation, which we label first-best. The first-best allocation maximizes
a symmetrically weighted average of home and foreign agents’ utilities subject to worldwide
resource constraints and can be described as:21





−1 + 1− α
] 1
1+φ , and N∗fbt = Y
∗fb





















where Ξt is a time-varying Pareto weight that denotes the relative weight that the social planner
assigns to Home at date t. We assume that, at date 0, the planner weighs the discounted lifetime
utility in both economies equally, which for the demand shock episode described in Section 2.5,
results in a Pareto weight path given by Ξt ≡ Ξemin{T,t}ζ̄ for Ξ = (ζ̄−ρ)/(ζ̄e(ζ̄−ρ)T −ρ) < 1.22 In
other words, the weight assigned to home agents is initially below one, grows during the demand
shock episode (reaching one at T̃ ≡ − ln Ξ/ζ̄ < T ) and settles above one from T onwards.
Equations (12)-(13) show that the social planner assigns high employment (i.e. low leisure)
and low consumption to Home (resp. low employment and high consumption to Foreign) when
Ξt is low and, accordingly, low employment (i.e. high leisure) and high consumption to Home
(resp. high employment and low consumption to Foreign) when Ξt is high. The paths of these
variables are depicted graphically in the panels (a) and (b) of Figure 1.
The path of the planner’s shadow values also offer a useful benchmark against which to
contrast decentralized outcomes. The shadow terms-of-trade, defined as the ratio of the planner’s




× αΞt + 1− α
α + (1− α) Ξt
. (14)
The first term of this expression reflects relative scarcity considerations (i.e., supply factors),
while the second term accounts for preference asymmetries (i.e., demand factors). Both elements
work in favor of a higher relative valuation of the foreign good initially, and a lower valuation
of it later on, as displayed in panel (c) of Figure 1.23
21See Appendix A.1 for a formal description of the planning problem yielding this allocation. The problem is
written for an arbitrary Pareto weight but our analysis focuses on a symmetric weight.
22Ξ is the Pareto weight assigned by the planner to Home at date 0. Due to differences in discounting,














23This is true in the presence of home bias. Without home bias (i.e., when α = 0.5), preferences for con-
12
(a) Home. (b) Foreign. (c) Shadow terms-of-trade.
Figure 1: First-best.
In the rest of the paper, we refer to the first-best level of output as potential output and to
the deviation of actual output from potential output as the output gap. Our analysis revolves
around the costs imposed by the ZLB under alternative capital flow regimes. These costs can
be summarized by three wedges between the decentralized and first-best allocations: the Home
labor wedge, ωt ≡ − ln(MRSt/MPLt), the Foreign labor wedge, ω∗t ≡ − ln(MRS∗t /MPL∗t ),
and the international “risk-sharing” wedge (which we abbreviate as the international wedge),
$t ≡ ln(Θt)− ln(Ξt).24 The following lemma relates the labor wedges to home output, foreign
output and the expenditure ratio Θt.
25
Lemma 1 (Labor wedges). In equilibrium, the labor wedges are given by




αΘ−1t + 1− α
)




αΘt + 1− α
)
. (15)
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
3 Positive analysis
In order to characterize decentralized outcomes, we need to specify how policy is conducted.
Since our interest lies in assessing the performance of alternative capital flow management
regimes, we find it convenient to assume that monetary policy is always set optimally by a
global monetary authority.26 Under this assumption, our goal in this section is to shed light on
sumption goods are symmetric and the second term is always equal to 1. In this case, shadow terms-of-trade
movements only reflects the relative scarcity of the two goods.
24By definitions, these three wedges are zero in the first-best.
25We will occasionally refer to a period with a negative labor wedge as a recession and to a period with a
positive labor wedge as a boom.
26This amounts to assuming that it is set cooperatively, and allows us to abstract from any inefficiencies arising
from non-cooperative or other suboptimal monetary policy setting. Note that cooperative and non-cooperative
monetary policy outcomes differ despite our adopted Cole-Obstfeld parametrization due to level (i.e., steady
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the role played by capital flows in a liquidity trap, by comparing the world economy’s adjustment
to the demand shock episode described in Section 2.5 under two stylized capital flow regimes:
free capital mobility and closed capital accounts.
3.1 Optimal monetary policy with free capital mobility
We assume that a benevolent global monetary authority operates under commitment and spec-
ifies the path of nominal interest rates it for Home and i
∗
t for Foreign in order to maximize a
symmetrically weighted sum of welfare in both countries.27 Importantly, the monetary authority
is constrained to set non-negative nominal interest rates in each country at all times.28 While
Appendix A.2 describes and characterizes the optimal monetary policy problem for any capital
flow regime, in what follows, we describe the optimal policy problem under a regime of free
























subject to the implementability constraints (7), (8), (9) and (10) with τt − τ ∗t = 0 and thus,
Θt = Ξt for all t. The following lemma sets the stage by characterizing the optimal policy away
from (or absent) the ZLB.
Lemma 2 (Unconstrained optimal monetary policy). Absent the ZLB, optimal monetary policy
implements the first-best allocation by choosing an initial exchange rate of E0 = ϑ0 and an
interest rate path given by:
It = ρ+
(1− α) Ξt + α1+φ
(1− α) Ξt + α




αΞt + (1− α)
ζt, (16)
implying sign(I∗t − It) = −sign(ζt) and an exchange rate path of Et = ϑt.
Proof. See Appendix B.2.
Intuitively, optimal policy responds to the demand shock episode described in Section 2.5
by lowering the nominal interest rates in both countries, but more so in Home. Owing to the
interest parity condition, the resulting interest rate differential is accompanied by a continuous
appreciation of the home currency during the episode (Ėt/Et < 0 for 0 ≤ t < T ), following
depreciation on impact (i.e., at t = 0, E0 jumps up from 1). The resulting terms-of-trade path
state) effects related to countries’ market power that cannot be undone via labor subsidies since firms do not set
prices.
27The symmetric Pareto weight is given explicitly in Section 2.6 (see in particular footnote 22).
28We are agnostic about whether such ZLB constraints exist because the monetary authority is truly unable
to set negative rates or because it has imposed such a constraint on itself voluntarily.
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coincides with that of the shadow terms-of-trade in the first-best: home goods are relatively
cheaper initially (from 0 to T̃ ) and then more expensive (from T̃ to T ). Since output is demand
determined, this relative price path naturally allows the monetary authority to achieve the
first-best allocation.
Home’s trade balance is given in terms of the home good by
TBt = α(1−Θt)C∗t E1−αt . (17)
For Θt = Ξt, it is positive initially (from 0 to T̃ ), and then negative (from T̃ onwards). After
the shock has dissipated (i.e., after T ), Home runs a permanent trade deficit financed by the
foreign assets accumulated during the episode. Hence, trade imbalances and capital flows are a
key part of the adjustment allowing the first-best to be achieved. They allow temporarily more
patient home agents to reduce both consumption and leisure simultaneously, and catch up later
with accordingly higher consumption and leisure.
However, the unconstrained policy described in Lemma 2 is not always implementable. That
is the case when one of the interest rate expressions in (16) results in a negative nominal rate.
We refer to such a situation as a liquidity trap in the country in question. For the rest of the
paper, we focus on a situation where the home demand shock is large enough to make Home
experience a liquidity trap, yet small enough not to make Foreign experience one. We thus make
the following assumption:










)e−ζ̄T [ζ̄e(ζ̄−ρ)T − ρ] . (18)
Under these circumstances, the optimal policy is described by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 (Optimal monetary policy at the ZLB). Consider a demand shock scenario for which
Assumption 1 holds. Then the optimal policy is characterized as follows:
1. In Home, the ZLB binds, the interest rate path is described by it = 0 for t ∈ [0, T̂ ) and













29Notice that in the limiting case of extreme home bias (α→ 0), this condition trivially reduces to ρ < ζ̄ -the
closed economy condition under which the natural rate becomes negative. Thus, a small α is enough to ensure
that the condition (18) is satisfied if ρ < ζ̄. A necessary condition for the parameter set satisfying condition





(remember that home bias requires α < 1/2). Loosely speaking, for a
given duration of the liquidity trap T the shock ζ̄ cannot be too large, or equivalently, for a given shock ζ̄, the
duration of the trap T cannot be too long.
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and the differential equation (9) with terminal condition YT̂ = Y
fb
T . Furthermore, the
output gap is negative on impact: Y0 < Y
fb
0 .
2. In Foreign, the ZLB does not bind, the interest rate path is described by i∗t = I∗t , and
output is at its first best level Y ∗t = Y
∗fb
t at all time.




Proof. See Appendix B.3.
Some aspects of the optimal policy outcome common to closed economy frameworks are
worth mentioning. First, it is optimal for the monetary authority to make a commitment to
keep the home interest rate at zero even after the demand shock scenario has ended at date
T . This commitment, known to be a feature of optimal monetary policy at the ZLB and often
referred to as “forward guidance,” generates a boom in demand after the end of the liquidity
trap. This future boom in turn dampens the initial decline of output via the intertemporal
channel. Second, the ZLB exit time T̂ is precisely chosen so as to minimize (weighted) average
deviations from the first-best output path. We will refer to the period from 0 to T as phase
I of the liquidity trap, and to the period from T to T̂ as phase II. The ZLB therefore implies
that home output falls short of its first-best level on impact, grows continuously during phase I,
overshooting its first-best level late during that phase, before reverting back to it by the end of
phase II, as shown in the left panel of Figure 2 (dark solid line). This characterization of optimal
policy is reminiscent of earlier results in the closed economy ZLB literature (e.g., Eggertsson
and Woodford, 2003 and Werning, 2012).
Owing to our unitary elasticities assumptions, each country’s interest rate is set only with
regard to its own output path. Our model therefore abstracts from the monetary policy interde-
pendence and spillovers that have been the focus of most of the open economy literature on the
ZLB (e.g., Haberis and Lipinska, 2012 and Fujiwara et al., 2013). This feature delivers a sharp
characterization of exchange rate dynamics at the ZLB. Under a regime of free capital mobility,
the exchange rate path is tightly linked interest rate differentials through the interest parity
condition. Relative to what would prevail absent the ZLB, the differential is smaller during
phase I and larger during phase II. As a result, the home currency appreciates too slowly during
phase I and too fast during phase II. Lemma 3 indicates that as a result, the home exchange
rate does not depreciate sufficiently on impact. This is shown in the right panel of Figure 2
(dark solid line).
The above characterization indicates that early in phase I, in addition to being too expensive
relative to the future home good (a notion familiar from the closed economy analysis), the current
home good is also too expensive relative to the current foreign good. Thus, in analogy with the
mechanism by which output has to drop on impact to make consumers content with their savings
16
choice when facing an excessively high interest rate in a liquidity trap, here home output has to
drop relative to foreign output to make consumers content with their intra-temporal expenditure
allocation decision when facing an excessively appreciated home currency.
(a) Home output. (b) Exchange rate.
Figure 2: Home output and exchange rate paths under ZLB with free capital mobility (solid
dark), ZLB with closed capital accounts (dashed dark) and unconstrained policy with free capital
mobility (solid light).
Regarding consumption dynamics, it is easy to establish that home consumption falls on
impact, tilts up during phase I and tilts down during phase II. Foreign consumption, on the
other hand, jumps up on impact, before tilting down during phase I and II. The paths of the
main model variables are shown for illustration purposes in Figure 3 (dark solid line).30
The distortions caused by the ZLB constraint can be summarized by the three wedges defined
in Section 2.6. Under a regime of free capital mobility, a binding ZLB constraint in Home
translates into an opening of the home labor wedge, but not of the foreign labor wedge and
the international wedges. More precisely, the home labor wedge path mirrors the output gap
path. It jumps up on impact, decreases during phase I, and increases during phase II. This
corroborates the finding that the ZLB causes a recession-boom cycle in Home, and suggests
that this cycle is the key source of efficiency losses relative to the unconstrained policy outcome
when capital flows freely across countries.
30 The parametrization used to generate the figure relies on standard values from the literature. We set the
discount rate to ρ = 0.04, the openness parameter to α = 0.2, and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply to
φ = 3. For parameters pertaining to our demand shock trap scenario, we follow Werning (2012). The duration
of the shock is set to T = 2 years, and the size of the demand shock is set to ζ̄ = 2ρ. In a closed economy
benchmark, such a shock size would result in a natural real interest rate of -4% for the duration of the liquidity
trap. These parameter values satisfy Assumption 1. Unless noted otherwise, they are used for all our subsequent
figures.
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Figure 3: Variable paths under ZLB with free capital mobility (solid dark), ZLB with closed
capital accounts (dashed dark) and unconstrained policy with free capital mobility (solid light).
3.2 Capital flows at the ZLB
To shed light on the role played by international capital flows in a liquidity trap, we conduct the
experiment of shutting down capital accounts and contrast the resulting allocations and prices to
those obtained under a regime of free capital mobility. In doing so, we allow for intra-temporal
trade but require it to be balanced period by period. The price implementation of shutting
down international capital flows entails setting a tax wedge of τt − τ ∗t = ζt.31 This implies that
the expenditure ratio is fixed at 1. The optimal monetary policy problem under closed capital
accounts is thus isomorphic to the case of free capital mobility, but with τt− τ ∗t = ζt and Θt = 1
∀t ≥ 0. In these circumstances, the IS equations (9) and (10) are given by their closed economy







1− α + αΞ−1t
)




αΞt + 1− α
ζt. (20)
The following lemma adapts Lemma 3’s description of optimal monetary policy at the ZLB to
the case of closed capital accounts.
31More generally, it entails setting τt − τ∗t = ζt − ζ∗t in order to achieve Θ̇t/Θt = 0 according to (4).
32See Appendix A.2 for an analysis of optimal monetary policy for an arbitrary capital flow regime.
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Lemma 4 (Optimal monetary policy at the ZLB with closed capital accounts). Consider a
liquidity trap scenario for which Assumption 1 holds. Then the optimal policy outcome is iso-
morphic to that of Lemma 3, with the following modifications: (i) the foreign interest rate is
given in (20), and (ii) the initial exchange rate is given by Eclosed0 = Y closed0 /Y
*fb
0 .
Proof. The proof of Lemma 3 applies.
The unconstrained interest rate expressions in (20) indicate that in our demand shock sce-
nario, the following inequalities hold for t ∈ [0, T ): Iclosedt < I freet < 0 and I*closedt > I*freet > 0.
In other words, closing capital accounts makes Home experience a deeper liquidity trap, while
pushing Foreign further away from experiencing one. We will now argue that closing capital
accounts hampers the adjustment process in a number of additional dimensions.
Proposition 1 (Capital flows in a liquidity trap). Relative to the free capital mobility regime,
a regime of closed capital accounts results in
1. a further delay of the optimal ZLB exit time (T̂ closed > T̂ free),
2. a more variable path of home output and output gap.
Proof. See Appendix B.5.
This comparison is illustrated in Figure 2, where the free capital mobility and closed cap-
ital accounts regime are respectively represented by a dark solid line and a dark dashed line.
The proposition indicates that the adjustment process happening in Home takes longer and is
features larger inefficient output fluctuations when capital flows are constrained. We interpret
this as evidence that capital flows play a fundamentally smoothing role in a liquidity trap. In
what follows, we describe the paths of other key macro variables under closed capital accounts
to shed light on the mechanisms behind this result.
Our first observation is that under a closed capital account, exchange rate movements lose
their stabilizing role during the liquidity trap; rather than facilitating expenditure switching in
favor of the home good early on, they hamper it. Despite a positive interest rate differential
between Foreign and Home – in fact, a larger one than under free capital mobility – distorted
interest parity does not require the home currency to continuously appreciate during phase I.
Instead, it continuously depreciates during phase I (Ėt/Et = −I*closedt +τ ∗t −τt > 0 for t ∈ [0, T )),
and may even appreciate (rather than depreciate) on impact if the drop in Home output is severe
enough.33 Hence, the exchange rate “moves the wrong way” from the perspective of stabilizing
expenditure reallocation during the liquidity trap. Under free capital mobility, a continuous ap-
preciation of the home currency during phase I contributed to encourage expenditure switching
33To establish the depreciation during phase I, note that for t ∈ [0, T ), ζt = −ζ̄ so that −I*closedt + τ∗t − τt =
φ
1+φαΞt+(1−α)
αΞt+(1−α) ζ̄ − ρ >
(1−α)
αΞt+(1−α) ζ̄ − ρ > 0, where the last inequality follows from Assumption 1.
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in favor of the home good in the early stage of the trap, precisely at the time when the home
good was the most under-provided. Without capital flows, in contrast, a continuous deprecia-
tion of the home currency during phase I diverts expenditure away from the home good when
its provision is the most depressed.
Our second observation is that the absence of capital flows prevents the decoupling of con-
sumption from output which is characteristic of the first-best allocation. Under free capital
mobility, trade surpluses in the early stage of phase I allowed Home to satisfy its desire to shift
consumption forward, while letting current demand for its good be supported by foreign con-
sumers. This channel is unavailable when capital is not able to flow. Instead of experiencing an
initial consumption boom, Foreign experiences a consumption bust on impact.34 The contrast
in the exchange rate paths between both regimes can be further interpreted from the perspective
of the trade balance. Under free capital mobility, Foreign was initially running a trade deficit.
Thus, for trade to be balanced under closed capital accounts, the relative price of home goods
must initially increase to reduce Foreign’s incentives to import them.
The paths of the main model variables are contrasted with their free capital mobility coun-
terparts in Figure 3 (dark dashed line). The figure shows an opening of the foreign labor wedge
and of the international wedge, along with a more variable home labor wedge than under the
free capital mobility regime.
4 Efficient capital flows
The positive analysis of the preceding section emphasized the stabilizing role played by capital
mobility in a scenario where a region of the world economy experiences a liquidity trap. Its
concluding paragraph hinted at the additional distortions caused by impediments to cross-
border capital flows in such an episode. In this section, we adopt a normative perspective and
analyze the constrained efficiency properties of the free capital mobility regime.
4.1 Constrained planning problem
We frame this constrained efficiency question by formulating a Ramsey planning problem. We
endow the global planner with the ability to tax or subsidize international financial transactions,
in addition to its ability to set monetary policy under the zero bound constraint. The planning
34The behavior of home consumption on impact relative to the free capital flow regime depends on two
counteracting forces. On the one hand, the lack of savings opportunity pushes consumption up on impact. On
the other hand, the fact that Home output is more depressed pushes consumption down.
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problem is given by
max






















subject to (4), (7), (8), (9) and (10), with Θt only allowed to jump at t = 0. τt is the tax
on capital inflows into (or subsidy on outflows out of) Home. Without loss of generality, we
can assume that the planner sets the foreign capital flow tax τ ∗t to zero.
35 (4) and (7)-(10) are
implementability conditions, while it ≥ 0 and i∗t ≥ 0 are zero bound constraints.
4.2 Characterization of efficient regime
Framing the efficiency question via the above Ramsey problem has several advantages. First,
we can evaluate the constrained efficiency of the free capital mobility regime by asking a very
simple question, namely: Is the planner’s optimal choice characterized by τt = 0, ∀t? Second,
anticipating a negative answer to our first question, we can learn about the direction of the
inefficiency by analyzing the sign of the optimal capital flow tax. The following lemma provides
a characterization of the efficient capital flow regime.
Lemma 5 (Targeting rule in efficient capital flow regime). The constrained efficient capital flow
regime is characterized by the targeting rule





Proof. See part of Appendix A.3 leading up to equation (A.19).
As is standard with targeting rules in New Keynesian models (see, e.g., Woodford, 2003,
Gali, 2015), this rule does not directly describe what optimal policy should be, but rather
what it should target. It indicates that the planner aims for a balance between the distortions
experienced by Home (left-hand-side of (21)) and the ones experienced by Foreign (right-hand-
side of (21)), with a weight reflecting the time-varying Pareto weight Ξt. Absent (or away from)
the ZLB, all three wedges, i.e., the home labor wedge ωt, the foreign labor wedge ω
∗
t and the
international wedge $t, are zero. As a result, intervening in international financial markets is
undesirable in that case as τt = $̇t = 0 and the free capital mobility regime is constrained
efficient.36 This is no longer true when the ZLB binds for at least one country. When the ZLB
35We follow the literature in normative open-economy macroeconomics in assuming that the planner has access
to a date 0 transfer across the two countries. This assumption allows us to drop the country resource constraint
(11) from the planning problem and makes the tax differential τt − τ∗t (rather the individual taxes τt, τ∗t ) the
only relevant instrument. Normalizing τ∗t = 0 is thus without loss of generality.
36It actually turns out to be simply efficient (i.e., without the “constrained” qualification), since the first-best
allocation is achieved in this case.
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binds in Home but not in Foreign, free capital mobility is constrained inefficient, for it would
imply an opening of the home labor wedge only, a contradiction with the targeting rule (21).37
This result, together with a characterization of the constrained efficient regime, constitute our
main normative contribution.
To gain insights into the logic of the optimal policy intervention, it is useful to resort a
first-order Taylor approximation of some key equations around the symmetric steady state.38
First, linearizing the targeting rule (21) yields
ωt +$t = ω
∗
t −$t. (22)
Hence, faced with asymmetric labor wedges across countries, the planner wants to distort con-
sumption allocations in favor of the country with the smallest labor wedge, i.e., experiencing
the less severe recession (or the larger boom). Second, linearizing the labor wedge expressions
in (15) and writing them in gaps relative to the efficient (or flexible price) allocation delivers:
ωt = −α$t − (1 + φ) ỹt, and ω∗t = α$t − (1 + φ) ỹ∗t (23)
for the output gaps ỹt ≡ Ŷt − Ŷ fbt , ỹ∗t ≡ Ŷ ∗t − Ŷ
∗fb
t , where Ξ̂t ≡ ln Ξt, Ŷt ≡ ln(Yt/Y ), Ŷ ∗t ≡
ln(Y ∗t /Y
∗) and Ŷ fbt = −αΞ̂t/(1 + φ), Ŷ
∗fb
t = αΞ̂t/(1 + φ).
39 In a scenario of interest where
the ZLB does not bind in Foreign, the foreign output gap is zero at all times, ỹ∗t = 0, and the
foreign labor wedge is therefore proportional to the international wedge: ω∗t = α$t. Taking a
first-order Taylor approximation of the IS curves (9)-(10) and expressing these in gaps relative
to the efficient allocation yields
˙̃yt = it − rnt − α(τt − τ ∗t ), and ˙̃y∗t = i∗t − r∗nt + α(τt − τ ∗t ) (24)
where rnt ≡ ρ+
(










ζt are the home and foreign natural
real interest rate, respectively. Differentiating the two equations in (23) and the targeting rule
(22) with respect to time, and combining them with the IS curves in (24) when Home is at the
37This logic generically holds in the case where the ZLB binds in both countries. We briefly discuss this case
at the end of this section.
38This symmetric steady state is described in Appendix A.3.1.
39Thus, absent the international wedge, the labor wedges are simply proportional to the negative output gaps,
as in the standard closed economy model (coinciding with the limit where α → 0). However, for given output
gaps, a positive international wedge is associated with a smaller (i.e., more negative) home labor wedge and a
larger (i.e., more positive) foreign labor wedge. The intuition is that for given output levels, a larger international
wedge translates into higher home consumption, and therefore lower home marginal utility and a higher home
marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of consumption for leisure, thus reducing the labor wedge. Likewise, in
Foreign, a larger international wedge translates into lower consumption, higher marginal utility, a lower MRS,
and thus a higher labor wedge.
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ZLB but Foreign is not, yields:
τt−τ ∗t = −Ψrnt , i∗t = rn∗t +αΨrnt , ėt = −rn∗t +(1− α) Ψrnt , and ˙̃yt = − (1− αΨ) rnt
(25)
where et ≡ ln(Et), for Ψ ≡ (1 + φ)/[2 + α (φ− 1)] > 0.40 This compares with τt − τ ∗t = 0,
i∗t = r
n∗
t , ėt = −rn∗t and ˙̃yt = −rnt in the free capital mobility regime. Meanwhile, in either
regime, home monetary policy is set such that the home output gap averages out to zero over
time: (19) (which applies irrespective of the capital flow regime) is given in linearized form by∫ T̂
0
e−ρtỹtdt = 0. (22) and (23) then show that in the constrained efficient regime, the home
labor wedge, foreign labor wedge and international wedge must also average out to zero over
time. Given the these properties, one can think about the degree of distortions associated with
a regime as being related to the slope of these variables: smoother/less variable gaps or wedges
(as represented by smaller growth rates in absolute values) indicate smaller distortions.41 With
this in mind, we can summarize our main normative results in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Constrained efficient capital flow regime). The free capital mobility regime is
constrained efficient if and only if the ZLB constraints never bind. Furthermore, when the ZLB
binds in Home but not in Foreign from 0 to T , up to a first-order, the constrained efficient
regime compares with the free capital mobility regime as follows:
1. Capital flows out of Home are subsidized in phase I and taxed in phase II.
2. The home output gap is smoother, while the foreign output gap is still zero.
3. The home labor wedge is smoothed out at the expense of the foreign labor wedge and
international wedge, which both open.
4. The home exchange rate appreciates at a faster rate in phase I and at a slower rate in
phase II.
5. Monetary policy in Foreign is more expansionary in phase I and less expansionary in phase
II.
Proof. See argument in text.
Point 1. reflects the expression for τt in (25) according to which the optimal tax wedge on
flows from Home to Foreign is proportional to the negative of the home natural rate during the
time spent by Home at the ZLB. Since the home interest rate is zero at the ZLB, its negative
represents the gap between the home interest rate and its ideal level. This suggests that the
40Note that Ψ ≶ 1 and ∂Ψ/∂α ≷ 0 for φ ≶ 1. Furthermore, 0 < αΨ < 1.
41This representation admittedly abstracts from the fact that the ZLB exit time differs across capital flow
regimes.
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capital flow tax is used as a substitute for deficient home monetary policy, but only to the extent
that the policy deviates from its frictionless target.42 Since rnt < 0 during phase I and r
n
t = ρ > 0
during phase II, the optimal policy consists in subsidizing flows out of Home during phase I, and
taxing such flows during phase II.43 The intervention yields a smoother real adjustment in Home,
as evidenced by a reduction in the growth rates of the home output gap and home labor wedges
(points 2. and 3.).44 This improvement is achieved at the expense of a mild destabilization of
the foreign labor wedge and international wedge. Thus, from an optimal taxation perspective,
the planner’s intervention in the efficient capital flow regime can be seen as reflecting wedge
management: it is desirable to strike a balance between fluctuations in the model’s three wedges
so as to satisfy (21). Notice that under free capital mobility, (21) is violated since only the home
labor wedge was open, while the foreign labor wedge and the international wedge were zero at
all times.
How does the described path of capital flow tax result in a smoother adjustment in Home?
The intuition has to do with the tilting of the exchange rate path induced by the optimal tax
(points 4.). Through the distorted interest parity condition, a positive τt increases the required
rate of appreciation of the home currency in phase I, while a negative τt decreases it in phase
II. This tilting of the exchange rate path stabilizes demand for the home good, by switching
expenditure in its favor in the early stage of phase I, and at its expense in the late stage of phase
I and in phase II. Accordingly, and since expenditure switching occurs vis-à-vis the foreign good,
the capital flow tax is contractionary in Foreign when it is expansionary in Home and vice-versa
(see IS curves in (24)). And as the ZLB on the foreign nominal rate is not binding, foreign
monetary policy is optimally adjusted to a more expansionary (contractionary) stance in phase
I (II) so as to align foreign output with its natural level. Thus, in analogy to the manner in
which delaying exit from the ZLB in a closed economy allows borrowing monetary policy room
from the future, constrained efficient capital flow management can be interpreted as enabling a
transfer of monetary policy room across regions.
This stabilizing effect of efficient capital flow management is depicted in Figure 4, which
contrasts the paths of key variables in the efficient regime with their counterparts in the free
capital mobility regime and unconstrained benchmark.45 It is evident that the capital account
intervention results in a steeper exchange rate (and hence terms-of-trade) path, a smoother home
output gap, more pronounced consumption fluctuations and larger current account imbalances.
Accordingly, the home labor wedge is stabilized at the expense of the opening of the foreign
42“Frictionless” here refers to the absence of a ZLB constraint.
43For t ≥ T̂ , expression (25) does not hold any more, since the home output gap is back to zero. As a result,
and consistently with the targeting rule (21), all wedges are zero and so is the optimal capital flow tax.
44The home labor wedge growth rate is given by ω̇t =
2(1−α)+α
2(1−α)+α(1+φ) (1 + φ) r
n
t in the efficient regime, while it
was given by ω̇t = (1 + φ) r
n
t in the free capital mobility regime.
45The picture is produced using an exact non-linear solution to the planning problem, using the parametrization
described in Footnote 30.
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Figure 4: Variable paths under ZLB with free capital mobility (solid dark), ZLB with efficient
regime (dashed) and unconstrained policy (solid light).
labor wedge and the international wedge.
The underlying rationale for the constrained inefficiency of the free capital mobility regime is
an aggregate demand externality generically present in economies with nominal rigidities where
constraints on monetary policy make the socially optimal allocation unattainable (see Blanchard
and Kiyotaki (1987) for an early discussion focusing on pricing decisions, and more recently,
Farhi and Werning (2016) for a general treatment regarding financial choices). With the nominal
rigidities present in our model, prices fail to fulfill their allocative role, and the fall in demand
associated with agents’ increased desire to save pushes the economy into a recession. The
monetary authority internalizes these effects, attempts to nullify them by affecting intertemporal
prices, and is successful at correcting the externality with monetary policy alone absent (or away
from) the ZLB. But at the ZLB, it cannot lower the nominal rate sufficiently, and distorting
international savings decision leads to exchange rate movements that help curtail the severity
25
of the bust-booms cycle in Home.
While our constrained inefficiency result might appear to fall under the umbrella of the gen-
eral theory put forward by Farhi and Werning (2016), the multiple-currency model structure
called for by our particular application makes the mechanics of the intervention, and thus our
contribution, distinct. Rather than aiming to simply direct purchasing power toward agents
with the highest marginal propensity to consume (MPC) on relatively more depressed goods,
the optimal intervention in our model is guided by a desire to switch expenditure toward more
depressed goods by manipulating the only flexible component of relative prices, namely the
exchange rate. In fact, the resulting policy prescription is at odds with Farhi and Werning’s
general principle: while home agents have a higher MPC on the home good, our model’s pre-
scription entails discouraging spending by these agents at the precise time when this good is
relatively more depressed (early in phase I). The reason is that such a diversion supports an
exchange rate trajectory that induces all agents to redirect expenditure toward the home good
at that time. This underlines the relevance of the exchange rate regime for the direction of the
desirable intervention. Were the constraint on monetary policy arising from a peg rather than
a ZLB, this expenditure switching channel would be absent, and Farhi and Werning’s general
principle would apply (see Farhi and Werning, 2012).
A further benefit of our two-country model structure is that it naturally lends itself to an
investigation of the coordination problem inherent to capital flow policies in a liquidity trap, an
issue to which we turn in Section 5.
Global liquidity trap While our focus is on a scenario where only a region of the world
economy experiences a liquidity trap, it is worth noting that our normative results carry over
to an alternative global liquidity trap scenario (i.e., where the ZLB binds in both countries).
Indeed, combining the labor wedge expressions in (23) with the IS curves in (24), under the
assumption that it = i
∗
t = 0, yields
46
τt−τ ∗t = −ėt = −Ψg (rnt − rn∗t ) , ˙̃yt = − (1− αΨg) rnt −αΨgrn∗t , ˙̃y∗t = −αΨgrnt −(1− αΨg) rn∗t .
(26)
where the g superscript stands for “global” liquidity trap, and Ψg ≡ (1 + φ)/[2 (1 + αφ)]. This
contrasts with ėt = 0, ˙̃yt = −rnt and ˙̃y∗t = −rn∗t under free capital mobility. Thus, when the
ZLB binds everywhere, our result translates into one indicating that it is optimal to subsidize
outflows out of the country with the lowest natural interest rate. Devereux and Yetman (2014)
argue that imposing capital controls necessarily reduce welfare during a liquidity trap, using an
environment where due to an absence of home-bias and preference shocks that do not affect the
46These expressions hold at any instant where the ZLB binds in both countries. However, as the optimal ZLB
exit times does generally not coincide for Home and Foreign, after the first country has exited the ZLB but
before the second ones has, there is a time interval where expressions analogous to those in (25) will hold.
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dis-utility from labor supply, natural interest rates are by construction equal across countries at
all times. Our optimal tax expression in (26) reveals the knife-edge property of their results by
showing that the free capital mobility regime is only constrained efficient in non-generic cases
where natural rates happen to be equal in Home and Foreign.
5 Capital flow management and currency wars
Given the constrained inefficiency of a free capital mobility regime established in Section 4, it is
natural to ask whether the constrained efficient outcome can also be achieved in a decentralized
(i.e., non-cooperative) setting where each country sets its own capital flow taxes independently.
The objective of this section is to tackle this question.
5.1 Game between planners
In order to focus on the potential coordination problem pertaining to capital flow management,
we still delegate monetary policy decisions to a global monetary authority but let national plan-
ners in Home and Foreign set capital flow taxes optimally.47 The global planner sets monetary
policy optimally for all future dates and chooses a date 0 transfer b0 from Foreign to Home
to maximize global welfare. The home planner chooses a path for home capital flow taxes to
maximize home welfare, and the foreign planner chooses a path for foreign capital flow taxes to
maximize foreign welfare. The three planners choose their actions simultaneously at date 0.
The problem of the global planner is given by
max






















subject to (4), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11); the problem of the home planner is given by
max













subject to (4), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11); and the problem of the foreign planner is given by
max













47We retain the assumption of cooperative monetary policy so as to study the implications of non-
cooperativeness of capital flow management policies in a transparent fashion. In an earlier version (Acharya and
Bengui, 2015), we obtained qualitatively similar results and predictions under the assumption of non-cooperative
monetary policy.
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subject to (4), (7), (8), (9), (10) and (11).
The three planning problems are analyzed formally in Appendix A.4. In the next two
sections, we discuss the motivations faced by national planners and explain how these shape the
macroeconomic adjustment in a liquidity trap.
5.2 Best responses
Monetary policy is set by the global planner following the same principles as in Sections 3 and 4.
The global planner aims to replicate the first-best output paths in both countries, and whenever
the interest rates necessary to achieve that goal violates the ZLB, uses forward guidance to
minimize average output gaps over time. The new element of the policy setting analyzed in
this section is that the path of the expenditure ratio Θt, whose growth rate is taken as given
by the global monetary authority, is determined by the interaction of the capital flow taxes
set by the home and foreign planners. We thus turn to the forces driving optimal capital flow
management. The following lemma characterizes the national planners’ choices.
Lemma 6 (Targeting rules in non-cooperative capital flow regime). When capital flow taxes are












s ds = 1 + Ξte
−ω∗t+$t , (28)
where ΓH and ΓF denote the planners’ multipliers on their own country’s lifetime budget con-
straints.
Proof. See Appendix B.4.
In stark contrast with their efficient regime counterpart (21), these targeting rules indicate
that non-zero taxes are desirable for the national planners, even when wedges are zero. In order
to gain further insights into the logic of the optimal policy by national planners, it is again
useful to resort a first-order approximation of some key equations around the symmetric steady










This relation embeds the two types of incentives faced by the home planner when setting the
home capital inflow tax. The first term on the right-hand side of (29) represents a macroeco-
nomic stabilization motive: when the home labor wedge is contracting over time (ω̇t < 0), such
48This symmetric steady state is described in Appendix A.3.1.
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as in phase I when the output gap is growing ( ˙̃yt > 0), smoothing it requires engineering a more
depreciated home currency, which is achieved by encouraging outflows (τt > 0).
49 The second
term represents a dynamic terms-of-trade (henceforth, dToT) manipulation motive entailing
that it is optimal for the home planner to smooth out the expenditure ratio Θt. This second
motive is related to Costinot et al. (2014)’s result that when a country’s trade balance grows or
shrinks, managing the capital account provides a subtle way of extracting rents from foreigners
by exerting market power differentially across time periods. In the context of our model and
scenario, from the trade balance expression (17), Θ̇t > 0 during phase I indicates that Home’s
trade surplus (measured in marginal utility terms) is shrinking over time. When the home
trade surplus is positive but shrinking, taxing capital outflows induces the home consumer to
front load consumption and thereby contributes to smooth surpluses. This allows Home to reap
benefits from higher prices early in phase I, at times when the net sales to foreign buyers are
the greatest, through a dynamic manipulation of the terms-of-trade. On the margin, curtailing
capital outflows at this time makes home output relatively scarcer, allowing the Home planner
to earn higher monopoly rents. Similarly, when the home trade surplus turns negative late in
phase I, the mechanism is analogous: with growing deficits, subsidizing capital inflows induces
the home consumer to front load consumption, this time to smooth deficits. This allows Home
to reap benefits (monopsony rents) from lower prices late in phase I when the quantities pur-
chased by Home from Foreign are the greatest. Equation (29) makes clear that the two motives
just described conflict during a liquidity trap.
Using the linearized equilibrium labor wedge expression in (23), the linearized home IS curves
in (24), and the law of motion for the expenditure ratio Θt (4); relation (29) and its foreign
counterpart lead to linearized best responses describing a (home or foreign) planner’s optimal





















In both best response functions, the first term reflects macroeconomic stabilization motives,
the second one reflects dToT manipulation motives, and the third one reflects a combination of
both.50
Next, we look at the interplay between the macroeconomic stabilization and dToT manipu-
49The home labor wedge is contracting when the home output gap is growing. Recall that this is the case
during phase I, when the home output gap is growing after an initial fall to a negative value.
50Notice that the third term implies that the capital flow taxes are strategic complements. A larger tax on
inflows by Foreign pushes capital to flow into Home, leading to a more appreciated home currency. As a result
of both the macroeconomic stabilization motive and the dToT manipulation motive, the home planner responds
by adjusting its capital flow tax upwards. The same logic applies to the foreign planner.
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lation motives in the Nash equilibrium of the game played by the three planners.
5.3 Nash equilibrium
In the absence of the zero bound, it is straightforward to establish that from 0 to T the global
planner would set interest rates so as to perfectly stabilize the output gap in both countries,
the home planner would set a tax on outflows and the foreign planner would set a tax on
inflows.51 Without the ZLB, the equilibrium interest rate are given by it = r
n
t + αζt/(2 − α)
and i∗t = r
∗n
t − αζt/(2 − α), and the equilibrium capital flow taxes are τt = ζt/[2(2 − α)] and
τ ∗t = −ζt/[2(2− α)] implying an equilibrium tax wedge τt − τ ∗t = ζt/(2− α).52 In our demand
shock scenario where ζt < 0 from 0 to T , the home interest rate is lower than the home natural
rate, the foreign interest rate is higher than the foreign natural rate, the home planner sets a
tax on outflows, and the foreign planner sets a tax on inflows. Consistent with our discussion of
relation (29) in the preceding section, this suggests that independently from ZLB considerations,
uncoordinated capital flow management tends to hinder intertemporal trade and capital flows
across countries.
The intuition is that demand shocks lead to trade imbalances, but both countries face in-
centives to reduce these: Initially, Home wants to reduce its trade surpluses to exert monopoly
power, while Foreign wants to reduce its trade deficit to exert monopsony power. Current
account positions flip later on, but regardless of the sign of imbalances, it is attractive for
both countries to choose taxes which restrict capital flows, implying a lower growth rate of
Θt. In other words, the path of Θt is “smoother” than that of Ξt, opening up a interna-
tional wedge.53 Hence, in the absence of the ZLB, despite monetary policy being able to
successfully stabilize aggregate demand so as to implement first-best output everywhere, the





t ) (1− α + αΘt) /[(1− α) Θt + α] is smoother than that of the shadow terms-of
trade (14) and as a result, consumption decouples insufficiently from output relative to the
first-best allocation.
When monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB, it is unable to stabilize aggregate demand.
In this case, the insufficient adjustment in the terms-of-trade brought about by non-cooperative
capital flow management distorts not just relative consumption but also output, resulting in
even more pervasive efficiency losses. In our case of interest where the ZLB binds in Home




t − α(τt − τ ∗t ) and the global
51See equations (A.26) and (A.27) for our statement regarding output levels.
52From the IS equations in (24), the interest rates would be given by it = r
n
t +α(τt−τ∗t ) and i∗t = rn∗t −α(τt−τ∗t ).
Substituting these expressions into the best responses (30) and (31) leads to the equilibrium tax wedge expression.
53 Using the fact that the 0 < Θ̇t/Θt < Ξ̇t/Ξt with the lifetime budget constraint (11) implies that Ξ0 < Θ0 <
1. This is what we mean when we say that the path of Θt is smoother than Ξt.
30
monetary authority is unable to implement the first-best output path in Home.54 Substituting
the interest rate expressions into the best responses (30) and (31) yields
τt − τ ∗t = − (1− Φ) Ψrnt + Φζt, i∗t = rn∗t + α [(1− Φ) Ψrnt − αΦζt] , (32)
ėt = −rn∗t + (1− α) [(1− Φ) Ψrnt − Φζt] , ˙̃yt = − [1− (1− Φ)αΨ] rnt − Φζt.
for Φ ≡ 2/[4 + α (φ− 1)].55 The Nash equilibrium tax wedge expression in (32) is a weighted
average of an aggregate demand stabilization term, already present in the efficient regime ex-
pression in (25), and a new, conflicting, dToT manipulation term. Home monetary policy is





The main properties of the Nash regime is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Non-cooperative capital flow regime). When the ZLB binds in Home but not in
Foreign from 0 to T, up to a first-order, the non-cooperative regime compares with the constrained
efficient regime as follows:
1. Capital flows out of Home are less subsidized in phase I and less taxed in phase II.
2. The home output gap is less smooth.
3. The home exchange rate appreciates at a slower rate in phase I and at a faster rate in
phase II.
Moreover, in phase I, relative to the free capital mobility regime, capital flows out of Home may
even be taxed (rather than subsidized), the home output gap may be less smooth, and the home
exchange rate may appreciate at a slower rate.
Proof. See argument in the text above.
These results show that the idea put forward in the context of the best responses that
dToT management motives conflict with macroeconomic stabilization finds its way to the Nash
equilibrium. Notably, they indicate that the tax wedge in the non-cooperative regime falls short
of its efficient value and may even take the “wrong” sign during phase I of the liquidity trap.
The determination of the Nash equilibrium is illustrated for the special case of a unit Frisch
elasticity (φ = 1, implying Ψ = 1 and Φ = 1/2) in the (τt, τ
∗
t ) space in Figure 5. The free
capital mobility regime, corresponding to a zero tax wedge, is represented by the straight line
τ ∗t = τt. Points to the South-East of this line represent regimes associated with net subsidies
54Our analysis of non-cooperative capital flow management can easily be extended to accommodate situations
where the ZLB binds in both countries.
55Note that 0 < Φ < 1, ∂Φ/∂φ < 0 and ∂Φ/∂α ≷ 0 for φ ≶ 1. Moreover, limφ→∞Φ = 0.
56Note however that unlike in the constrained efficient and free capital mobility regime, the home labor wedge,
foreign labor wedge, and international wedge do not necessarily also average out to zero over time
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on flows from Home to Foreign, while points to the North-West of this line represent regimes
associated with net taxes on such flows. The closed capital account regime, corresponding to a
tax wedge of ζt, is represented by the straight line τ
∗
t = −ζt+τt. The constrained efficient regime,
corresponding to a tax wedge of −rnt , is represented by the straight line τ ∗t = rnt + τt. Finally,
the home and foreign planners’ best responses (30) and (31), drawn at the Nash equilibrium
interest rates, are represented by the straight lines τ ∗t = [(3 + α) τt + 2r
n
t − ζt] / (1 + α) and
τ ∗t = [(1 + α) τt + αr
n
t − (1 + α) ζt] / (3 + α). The figure shows that the Nash outcome features
too small a subsidy to flows from Home to Foreign in phase I, and too small a subsidy to flows
from Foreign to Home in phase II. In phase I, it even illustrates a case where flows from Home to
Foreign end up being taxed, while efficiency consideration would require them to be subsidized.
With unit Frisch elasticity, the sign of the tax wedge is unambiguously negative in phase I
of the liquidity trap (unlike in the efficient regime where it was positive). More generally, it






(1− α) ζ̄ − ρ
]
, i.e., labor supply is
sufficiently elastic. The intuition is that with sufficiently elastic labor supply, labor wedge or
output gap fluctuations are not too costly for the home planner, and the dToT manipulation
force more easily dominates the macroeconomic stabilization force in equilibrium. For the
liquidity trap scenario parametrization of Werning (2012), for which ζ̄ = 2ρ, the condition
becomes φ < 3/ (1− 2α). This condition is satisfied for most values of the Frisch elasticity and
trade openness used in the open economy literature.
(a) Phase I: t ∈ [0, T ). (b) Phase II: t ∈ [T, T̂ ).
Figure 5: Linearized best-responses and Nash equilibrium when φ = 1.
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Figure 6 illustrates the effects of the distortions induced by the non-cooperative regime by
plotting the paths of the model’s main variables.57 It is again apparent that relative to the
efficient regime, the tax wedge has the wrong sign during phase I, and is too small during phase
II. As a consequence, during the liquidity trap, the exchange rate path is smoother during phase
I than under both the efficient regime and the free capital mobility regime. The uncoordinated
capital flow management regime thus hampers smooth adjustment, as suggested by the more
variable home output gap, home labor wedge, foreign labor wedge, and international wedge
paths than under the free capital mobility regime.





























































































Figure 6: Variable paths under ZLB with free capital mobility (solid dark), ZLB with efficient
regime (dashed), ZLB with non-cooperative regime (dashed-dotted), and unconstrained policy
(solid light).
57The picture is produced using an exact non-linear solution of the game, using the parametrization described
in Footnote 30.
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Global liquidity trap While our main scenario of interest is one where a single region experi-
ences a liquidity trap, it is easy to extend our analysis to a situation in which the demand shock
at Home is large enough to push the entire global economy into a liquidity trap. In this global
liquidity trap case, similar forces are at play - dToT management motives still work counter
to aggregate demand stabilization. As in the case where only Home hits the ZLB, the Nash
equilibrium tax wedge is a weighted average of an aggregate demand stabilization term already
present in the efficient regime expression in (26), and a dToT manipulation term. The resulting
non-cooperative equilibrium in addition features Foreign output away from the first-best levels.
6 Discussion of potential extensions
Our positive and normative analysis of capital flows in a liquidity trap was conducted in a
purposefully stylized general equilibrium model of the world economy. In this section, we briefly
discuss the likely robustness of our results with respect to several natural extensions.
Sticky prices For the sake of analytical tractability, we have assumed that prices were fully
rigid. A more realistic (and standard) assumption would be one under which prices would
instead be sticky. Allowing for sticky prices (e.g., à la Rotemberg, 1982 or Calvo, 1983) would
likely not qualitatively change our results, but would substantially reduce tractability. From a
positive perspective, increased price stability is known to often be destabilizing in a liquidity
trap (see Eggertsson, 2010 and Bhattarai et al., 2014). In our context, sticky rather than rigid
prices would allow a stronger deflationary pressure in Home than in Foreign to materialize and
thereby create an additional destabilizing force by making the terms-of-trade respond perversely
(i.e., shifting expenditure away from home goods at the beginning of the liquidity trap).58 As
such, they would not eliminate – and may even instead reinforce – the benefits of the stabilizing
exchange rate movements associated with international capital flows. Our main insights can
therefore be expected to apply as long as prices are not fully flexible.
Global liquidity trap While the global events constituting our motivation of the paper led
us to focus on a scenario where only Home experiences a liquidity trap, the brief analysis in the
concluding paragraph of Section 4 showed that our main insights carry through to a situation
where the entire world enters a liquidity trap. Pursuing a detailed analysis in this direction
would not compromise our framework’s tractability and may provide a fruitful avenue for future
research.
58Controlling for the exchange rate, a higher PPI deflation in Home than in Foreign early in the liquidity trap
would make the home good cheaper and cheaper over time, relative to the foreign good. Cook and Devereux
(2013) refer to this effect as a “perverse response” of the terms-of-trade in a liquidity trap.
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Pricing currency The mechanism driving our results on the stabilizing role of capital flows
in a liquidity trap crucially relies on the expenditure switching effect brought about by exchange
rate movements. As is well known, this effect is at work under the standard producer currency
pricing (PCP) assumption we have adopted, but would be absent under the alternative assump-
tion of local currency pricing. Given our motivation stemming from the Great Recession and
accordingly, our interpretation of Home as the set of advanced economies and of Foreign as the
set of emerging economies, an arguably more realistic pricing assumption would be that of dom-
inant currency pricing (see Gopinath, 2016 and Casas et al., 2016). Under this paradigm, all
internationally traded goods would be priced in Home’s currency (i.e., the dominant currency).
As a result, expenditure switching would not operate on home consumers but it would still op-
erate on foreign consumers. Under this empirically more plausible pricing currency assumption,
capital flows would thus help stabilize aggregate demand in Home by triggering expenditure
switching by foreign consumers only (as opposed to by all consumers under PCP). The strength
of the forces underlying our mechanism would consequently be somewhat weakened, but our
main insights would not change qualitatively.
Non-cooperative monetary policy Throughout the paper, we have assumed that monetary
policy was conducted cooperatively. In an earlier version (Acharya and Bengui, 2015), we
analyzed the case where monetary policy is instead conducted non-cooperatively and obtained
qualitatively similar results and predictions.
7 Conclusion
We argue that when a large region of the world economy experiences a liquidity trap, global
capital flows allow for a reallocation of demand and expenditures and are therefore stabilizing.
Owing to aggregate demand externalities operating at the zero lower bound, free capital flows
are nonetheless constrained inefficient and result in reallocations that are too small. Global
efficiency requires larger flows during and after the liquidity trap, to compensate for monetary
policy’s inability to stimulate aggregate demand in the region where the zero bound on interest
rates is binding. Despite pointing to inefficient capital flows in a liquidity trap, our analysis
does not support the management of capital flows by individual countries. To the contrary,
it suggests that the terms-of-trade management objectives underlying such policies may inter-
fere with aggregate demand stabilization and thus hamper, rather than promote, a smooth
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A Optimal policy appendix
A.1 First-Best Allocation
The socially optimal allocation, which we refer to as first-best, is the allocation that solves an un-
constrained social planning problem. Imposing symmetric consumption of the differentiated goods



















































s )ds is a time-varying Pareto weight assigned by the planner to Home.60 The
first-order conditions of this problem lead to first-best employment/output




αΞ−1t + 1− α
] 1
1+φ and N∗fbt = Y
∗fb









































Furthermore, the multipliers on the home and foreign resource constraints, (A.1) and (A.2), are
















× αΞt + 1− α
α+ (1− α) Ξt
. (A.5)
59Such a symmetry is trivially optimal, given the assumed preferences and technologies.
60Ξ is the Pareto weight assigned by the planner to Home at date 0. Note that due to differences in discounting,















A.2 Optimal monetary policy
For given paths of Θt, τt, τ
∗
t , the optimal monetary policy problem is an optimal control problem with
control variables it, i
∗





























= it − (ρ+ ζt)−
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α
(ζ∗t − ζt + τt − τ∗t ) , (A.6)
Ẏ ∗t
Y ∗t
= i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α
(ζ∗t − ζt + τt − τ∗t ) , (A.7)
it ≥ 0 (A.8)
i∗t ≥ 0 (A.9)






















it − (ρ+ ζt)−
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α







i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α







t are the co-state variables associated with Yt, Y
∗
t , and νt, ν
∗
t are multipliers on the non-
negativity constraints for interest rates.
The planner’s optimal choice is characterized by the conditions
λtit = 0, it ≥ 0, λt ≥ 0, (A.10)
λ∗t i
∗
t = 0, i
∗
t ≥ 0, λ∗t ≥ 0, (A.11)
































initial conditions λ0 = λ
∗




































The planner’s optimal plan can be described as the particular solution to the system of first-order
differential equations in Yt, Y
∗
t , λt, λ
∗
t , it, i
∗
t consisting of (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), (A.9), (A.10), (A.11),




The symmetric steady-state associated with ζt = ζ
∗
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0 (and thus Ξt = Ξ = 1) is the
(unique) stationary point of the above described system. It is given by Yt = Y
∗
t = 1, λt = λ
∗
t = 0 and
it = i
∗
t = ρ. The associated steady-state labor wedges are hence equal to zero: ωt = ω
∗
t = 0.
A.3 Efficient capital flows
The optimal policy problem is an optimal control problem with control variables it, i
∗

































αΘ−1t + 1− α
)Ξt(αΞ−1t +1−α) (αΘt + 1− α)αΞt+1−α]}dt
subject to (A.6)-(A.9) (with τ∗t = 0) and
Θ̇t
Θt
= ζ∗t − ζt + τt (A.16)


























αΘ−1t + 1− α
)Ξt(αΞ−1t +1−α) (αΘt + 1− α)αΞt+1−α]}
+λtYt
[
it − (ρ+ ζt)−
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α







i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α











t , µt are the co-state variables associated with Yt, Y
∗
t ,Θt, and νt, ν
∗
t are multipliers on the
non-negativity constraints for interest rates.
The planner’s optimal choice is characterized by the complementary slackness conditions (A.10),
(A.11), the first-order condition for τt
µtΘt − λtYt
αΘ−1t





αΘt + 1− α
= 0, (A.17)



















αΘt + 1− α
]
−λtYt
α (1− α) Θ−2t(
αΘ−1t + 1− α
)2 Θ̇tΘt − λ∗tY ∗t α (1− α)(αΘt + 1− α)2 Θ̇tΘt − µt Θ̇tΘt (A.18)
non-negativity conditions λt ≥ 0, λ∗t ≥ 0, µt ≥ 0, initial conditions λ0 = λ∗0, µ0 = 0 for the co-state




t = 0, and limt→∞ µtΘt = 0.
Differentiating (A.17) with respect to time, substituting the co-state laws of motion (A.12), (A.13)
and (A.18), and using the wedge expressions in (15), yields:


































(ζ∗t − ζt) (A.20)
Integrating (A.12), (A.13) and (A.18) from 0 to ∞, and using the initial conditions and transver-


















αΘt + 1− α
]
dt. (A.21)
The planner’s optimal plan can be described as the particular solution to the system of first-order
differential equations in Yt, Y
∗
t ,Θt, λt, λ
∗
t , it, i
∗
t consisting of (A.6), (A.7) (both with τ
∗
t = 0), (A.8),
(A.9), (A.10), (A.11), (A.12), (A.13) and (A.20) with boundary conditions (A.14), (A.15), (A.21),
λ0 = 0 and λ
∗
0 = 0. The path of τt then follows from (A.16), and that of µt solves (A.18) with initial
condition µ0 = 0.
61Integration by parts is required to obtain (A.21).
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A.3.1 Symmetric steady-state
The symmetric steady-state associated with ζt = ζ
∗
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0 (and thus Ξt = Ξ = 1) is
the (unique) stationary point of the above described system. It is given by Yt = Y
∗
t = Θt = 1,
λt = λ
∗
t = µt = 0, it = i
∗
t = ρ and τt = 0. The associated steady-state wedges are hence equal to zero:
ωt = ω
∗
t = $t = 0.
A.4 Noncooperative capital flow management
A.4.1 Global planner’s problem
The global planner’s problem is an optimal control problem with control variables it, i
∗
t and b0 (a date
































αΘ−1t + 1− α
)Ξt(αΞ−1t +1−α) (αΘt + 1− α)αΞt+1−α]}
subject to (A.6)-(A.9) and
Θ̇t
Θt








s−τ∗s )ds (Θt − 1) dt (A.23)


























αΘ−1t + 1− α
)Ξt(αΞ−1t +1−α) (αΘt + 1− α)αΞt+1−α]}
+λG,tYt
[
it − (ρ+ ζt)−
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α







i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α





















G,t, µG,t are the co-state variables associated with Yt, Y
∗
t ,Θt; νt, ν
∗
t are multipliers on the
non-negativity constraints for interest rates and ΓG is the multiplier on the home lifetime budget
constraint.
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The global planner’s optimal choice is characterized by the complementary slackness conditions
λG,tit = 0, it ≥ 0, λG,t ≥ 0 (A.24)
λ∗G,ti
∗
t = 0, i
∗
t ≥ 0, λ∗G,t ≥ 0 (A.25)




















































αΘt + 1− α
]
−λG,tYt
α (1− α) Θ−2t(
αΘ−1t + 1− α
)2 Θ̇tΘt − λ∗G,tY ∗t α (1− α)(αΘt + 1− α)2 Θ̇tΘt − µG,t Θ̇tΘt (A.28)
non-negativity conditions λG,t ≥ 0, λ∗G,t ≥ 0, µG,t ≥ 0, initial conditions λG,0 = λ∗G,0 = µG,0 = 0




G,t = 0, and
limt→∞ µG,tΘt = 0.
Integrating (A.26), (A.27) and (A.28) from 0 to ∞, and using the initial and transversality con-
ditions, yields (A.14), (A.15) and (A.21). For given paths for τt, τ
∗
t , the global planner’s optimal
plan can be described as the particular solution to the system of first-order differential equations in
Yt, Y
∗




t consisting of (A.6), (A.7), (A.8), (A.9), (A.22), (A.24), (A.25), (A.26) and
(A.27) with boundary conditions (A.14), (A.15), (A.21), λG,0 = 0 and λ
∗
G,0 = 0. The optimal transfer
is then given by (A.23), and the path of µG,t solves (A.28) with initial condition µG,0 = 0.
A.4.2 Home planner’s problem

























αΘ−1t + 1− α
)1−α
(αΘt + 1− α)α
]}
subject to (A.6)-(A.9), (A.22), (A.23).
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αΘ−1t + 1− α
)1−α




it − (ρ+ ζt)−
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α






i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α


















H,t, µH,t are the co-state variables associated with Yt, Y
∗
t ,Θt; ΓH is home planner’s mul-
tiplier on the home lifetime budget constraint.
The home planner’s optimal choice is characterized by the first-order condition
µH,tΘt − λH,tYt
αΘ−1t





αΘt + 1− α
= 0, (A.29)
































αΘ−1t + 1− α
− α
2









α (1− α) Θ−2t(
αΘ−1t + 1− α
)2 Θ̇tΘt − λ∗H,tY ∗t α (1− α)(αΘt + 1− α)2 Θ̇tΘt − µH,t Θ̇tΘt (A.32)
non-negativity conditions λH,t ≥ 0, λ∗H,t ≥ 0, µH,t ≥ 0, initial conditions λH,0 = λ∗H,0 = 0 for the co-
state variables associated with Yt, Y
∗





0, and limt→∞ µH,tΘt = 0.
Differentiating (A.29) with respect to time, and substituting the co-state laws of motion (A.30),







s )ds = 1 + Θ−1t e
−ωt . (A.33)















Integrating (A.30) and (A.31) from 0 to ∞, and using the initial and transversality conditions for
λt, λ
∗




t and a given transfer b0, the home planner’s
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optimal plan can be described as the particular solution to the system of first-order differential equations
in Yt,Θt consisting of (A.6) and (A.34), with boundary conditions (A.14) and (A.23). The path of τt
then follows from (A.22); that of Y ∗t solves (A.7) with boundary condition (A.15); those of λH,t, λ
∗
H,t
solve (A.30), (A.31) with boundary conditions λH,0 = λ
∗
H,0 = 0; and that of µH,t follows from (A.29).
Finally, the value of ΓH can then be backed out from (A.32).
A.4.3 Foreign planner’s problem





























αΘ−1t + 1− α
)α
(αΘt + 1− α)1−α
]}











where b̃0 is the transfer between Foreign and Home set by the global planner, but expressed in terms
of date 0 home (rather than foreign) marginal utility.62























αΘ−1t + 1− α
)α




it − (ρ+ ζt)−
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α






i∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ) +
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α




















F,t, µF,t are the co-state variables associated with Yt, Y
∗
t ,Θt; ΓF is foreign planner’s mul-
tiplier on the foreign lifetime budget constraint.
The foreign planner’s optimal choice is characterized by the first-order condition
µF,tΘt − λF,tYt
αΘ−1t





αΘt + 1− α
= 0, (A.36)
62It is analytically more convenient to express the foreign country’s lifetime budget constraint in terms of
home marginal utility. See online Appendix C.5.2 for details.
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αΘ−1t + 1− α
− (1− α) α






α (1− α) Θ−2t(
αΘ−1t + 1− α
)2 Θ̇tΘt − λ∗F,tY ∗t α (1− α)(αΘt + 1− α)2 Θ̇tΘt − µF,t Θ̇tΘt (A.39)
non-negativity conditions λF,t ≥ 0, λ∗F,t ≥ 0, µF,t ≥ 0, initial conditions λF,0 = λ∗F,0 = 0 for the co-state
variables associated with Yt, Y
∗





and limt→∞ µF,tΘt = 0.
Differentiating (A.36) with respect to time, and substituting the co-state laws of motion (A.37),







s+τs)ds = 1 + Θte
−ω∗t . (A.40)























Integrating (A.30) and (A.31) from 0 to ∞, and using the initial and transversality conditions for
λt, λ
∗




t and a given transfer b̃0, the home planner’s
optimal plan can be described as the particular solution to the system of first-order differential equations
in Y ∗t ,Θt consisting of (A.7) and (A.41), with boundary conditions (A.15) and (A.35). The path of
τ∗t then follows from (A.22); that of Yt solves (A.6) with boundary condition (A.14); those of λF,t, λ
∗
F,t
solve (A.37) and (A.38) with boundary conditions (A.14) and λF,0 = λ
∗
F,0 = 0; and that of µF,t follows
from (A.36). Finally, the value of ΓF can then be backed out from (A.39).
A.4.4 Nash equilibrium
A Nash equilibrium of the game is a set of policy actions by the three planners {it, i∗t , τt, τ∗t }t≥0 , b0 and
associated allocations {Yt, Y ∗t ,Θt}t≥0 such that:
1. Taking {τt, τ∗t }t≥0 as given, the actions {it, i∗t }t≥0 , b0 and allocations {Yt, Y ∗t ,Θt}t≥0 solve the
global planner’s problem.
2. Taking {it, i∗t , τ∗t }t≥0 and b0 as given , the actions {τt}t≥0 and allocations {Yt, Y ∗t ,Θt}t≥0 solve
the home planner’s problem.
3. Taking {it, i∗t , τt}t≥0 and b0 as given, the actions {τ∗t }t≥0 and allocations {Yt, Y ∗t ,Θt}t≥0 solve
the foreign planner’s problem.
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The Nash equilibrium allocations can be described as the particular solution to the system of
first-order differential equations in Yt, Y
∗




t consisting of (A.6), (A.7), (A.24), (A.25),
(A.26), (A.27) and (A.42), with boundary conditions (A.14), (A.15) and (A.21). The paths of τt and
τ∗t the follow from (A.22) and (A.34); the transfer is given by (A.23); and the home and foreign lifetime
budget constraint multipliers ΓH and ΓF can be backed up from (A.33) and (A.40).
A.4.5 Symmetric steady-state
The symmetric steady-state associated with ζt = ζ
∗
t = 0 for all t ≥ 0 (and thus Ξt = Ξ = 1) is
the (unique) stationary point of the above described system. It is given by Yt = Y
∗
t = Θt = 1,
λG,t = λ
∗
G,t = 0, it = i
∗
t = ρ and τt = τ
∗
t = 0. The associated steady-state wedges are hence equal to
zero: ωt = ω
∗
t = $t = 0, and the multipliers are given ΓH = ΓF = 2.
B Proofs appendix
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The home labor wedge is given by






























αΘ−1t + 1− α
)
where the second line follows from the home aggregate market clearing condition (5), and the thrid
line follows from the international “risk”-sharing condition (3).
The foreign labor wedge is given by


































αΘt + 1− α
)
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where the second line follows from the foreign aggregate market clearing condition (6), and the thrid
line follows from the international “risk”-sharing condition (3).
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
At a point in time where the home ZLB constraint (A.8) does not bind, the home co-state variable λt
is zero according to (A.10), home output is at its first-best level Yt = Y
fb
t according to (A.12), and the
home nominal rate, which we refer to as the unconstrained home nominal interest rate, is given by
it = It ≡ ρ+ ζt +
αΘ−1t
αΘ−1t + 1− α




αΞ−1t + 1− α
(ζ∗t − ζt) . (B.1)
Similarly, at a point in time where the foreign ZLB constraint (A.9) does not bind, the foreign co-state





(A.13), and the foreign nominal rate, which we refer to as the unconstrained foreign nominal interest
rate, is given by
i∗t = I∗t ≡ ρ+ ζ∗t −
αΘt
αΘt + 1− α




αΞt + 1− α
(ζ∗t − ζt) . (B.2)
Hence, under a regime of free capital flows where τt = τ
∗
t = 0 and (as a result) Θt = Ξt, the
expressions reduce to those in (16) (for ζ∗t = 0). Similarly, under a regime of closed capital accounts
where τt − τ∗t = ζt − ζ∗t and (as a result) Θt = 1, the expressions reduce to those in (20) (for ζ∗t = 0).
B.3 Proof of Lemma 3
The proof is by construction. First, we observe that the system of first-order differential equations
described at the end of Appendix A.2 can be split into two separate systems in Yt, λt, it on one hand,




t on the other hand. Therefore, one can analyze the solution for these two sets of variables
separately.
Starting with the foreign country, it is easy to verify that Assumption 1 implies that the uncon-
strained foreign interest rate is strictly positive for any t, both under the free capital mobility regime
(expression in (16)) and under the closed capital account regime (expression in (20)). It follows that the
unconstrained policy is feasible and optimal for the foreign country63 The conditions (A.11), (A.13),
(A.15) and λ∗0 = 0 are hence satisfied with i
∗
t = I∗t , Y ∗t = Y ∗fbt and λ∗t = 0 for all t ≥ 0.
Turning to the home country, it is easy to verify that Assumption 1 implies that the unconstrained
home interest rate is strictly negative for t ∈ [0, T ) but strictly positive for t ≥ T , both under the free
capital mobility regime (expression in (16)) and under the closed capital account regime (expression in
(20)). We conjecture that the optimal plan consists in setting it = 0 for t ∈ [0, T̂ ) and it ≥ T̂ provided
63Notice that the planner’s objective is additively separable in Yt and Y
∗























The associated values of the state and co-state variables are given as follows: Yt = Y
fb
t and λt = 0 for




























for t ∈ [0, T̂ ). It is straightforward to verify that this plan (by construction) satisfies all relevant
conditions (A.10), (A.12), (A.14) and λ0 = 0.
B.4 Proof of Lemma 6
Substituting (A.22) and the definition of the international wedge $t ≡ ln Θt − ln Ξt into (A.33) and
(A.40) yields (27) and (28), respectively.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 1



























condition (B.3) can be written as
f1(T̂ ) = f2(T̂ ). (B.4)
The functions satisfy f ′1(z) < 0, f
′
2(z) > 0, with f1(T ) > 0, f2(T ) = 0, limz→−∞ and limz→∞ f2(z) =
+∞.64 (B.4) therefore has a unique solution T̂ > T .
Now, observe that under free capital mobility, Θ−1t > Θ
−1
T for t < T , and Θt = ΘT for t ≥ T ,
while under closed capital accounts Θt = 1 for all t ≥ 0. As a result, we have f free1 (z) < f closed1 (z) and
f free2 = f
closed
2 for z > T . It must thus be that T̂
free < T̂ closed.
Claim 2. We observe that under both capital flow regimes under consideration, the growth rate




= lnY fbT , it must be that
64A sufficient condition for f1(T ) > 0 is that Ẏt/Yt > 0 for t ∈ [0, T ). Assumption 1 ensures that this holds
true under it = 0 for both the regime of free capital mobility and the regime of closed capital accounts.
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T . This in turn implies, in light of the higher growth rate of home output
under closed capital accounts (−ρ+ ζ̄ > 0) than under free capital mobility (−ρ+ ζ̄(1− α)/(αΘ−1t +
1− α) > 0), that lnY closed0 < lnY free0 < lnY fb0 . Claim #2 follows immediately.
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C Model appendix (online appendix)
C.1 Home household
Using the price index definitions, the home household’s budget constraint (1) can be expressed as
ȧt = itat +WtNt + Tt + Πt − PtCt +
(

































= it − πt − (ρ+ ζt), (C.2)
Ċt
Ct
= i∗t + τt − τ∗t +
Ėt
Et
− πt − (ρ+ ζt). (C.3)
C.2 Foreign household








































Its budget constraint expressed in its own currency is given by
Ḋ∗H,t
Et


























Defining a∗t ≡ D∗H,t/Et+D∗F,t as the foreign household’s net assets in foreign currency terms and making













t − P ∗t C∗t +
(
































C∗t . The households’ optimality conditions for labor supply,
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= it + τ
∗
t − τt −
Ėt
Et
− π∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ), (C.5)
Ċ∗t
C∗t
= i∗t − π∗t − (ρ+ ζ∗t ). (C.6)
C.3 International “risk”-sharing condition
Subtracting Foreign’s Euler equation for the home currency bond (C.5) from Home’s Euler equation







= τt − τ∗t +
Ėt
Et
+ π∗t − πt + ζ∗t − ζt,









= τs − τ∗s + ζ∗s − ζs.








s − ζs + τs − τ∗s ) ds
]
.
C.4 Goods market equilibrium
Clearing on the market for variety l in Home requires




















Given price symmetry (PH,t(l) = PH,t ∀l), substituting this equation into the definition of home



















= (1− α)Sαt Ct + αSαt QtC∗t
= [(1− α) Θt + α]Sαt QtC∗t (C.8)
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= [(1− α) + αΘt]S−αt C∗t (C.9)
C.5 Intertemporal budget constraints
C.5.1 Home intertemporal budget constraint
The equilibrium lump-sum rebate Tt in Home is the sum of the negative of the subsidy expenses on
outflows and the tax proceeds on inflows:
Tt = −τtEtDF,t + τtD∗H,t







where the second line follows from the definition of home net foreign assets at = DH,t + EtDF,t, and
the third line follows from the market clearing condition for home currency bond DH,t +D
∗
H,t = 0.
Substituting Πt = PH,tYt−WtNt and (C.10) into the home household’ budget constraint (C.1), while
recognizing that the Euler equations (C.2)-(C.3) (or, for that matter, (C.5)-(C.6)) imply a distorted
interest parity condition it − i∗t − τt + τ∗t − Ėt/Et = 0, we obtain Home’s resource constraint:
ȧt = (it − τt) at + PH,tYt − PtCt.
Expressed in terms of the marginal utility of foreign agents (i.e., normalizing by P ∗t EtC∗t ), noting that
Pt = Eαt and P ∗t = E−αt , the resource constraint is given by
ḃt =
(



















for bt ≡ at/(P ∗t C∗t Et). Substituting Foreign’s Euler equation for the home currency bond (C.5) yields
a current account equation given by
ḃt = (ρ+ ζ
∗ − τ∗t ) bt − (C∗t )
−1
(














s−τ∗s )ds (C∗t )
−1
(





Using the home good’s market clearing condition (C.8) and the international “risk”-sharing condition
56
(C.7), this constraint can be expressed as (11).
C.5.2 Foreign intertemporal budget constraint
The derivation is similar to that of the home intertemporal budget constraint. The equilibrium lump-
sum rebate T ∗t in Foreign is the sum of minus the subsidy expenses on outlflows and the tax proceeds
on inflows:








= −τ∗t a∗t , (C.11)
where, again, the second line follows from the definition of foreign net assets a∗t ≡ D∗H,t/Et +D∗F,t, and
the third line follows from the market clearing condition for the foreign currency bond D∗F,t+DF,t = 0.




t −W ∗t N∗t and (C.11) into the foreign household’ budget constraint (C.4),
while recognizing that the Euler equations (C.2)-(C.3) (or, for that matter, (C.5)-(C.6)) imply a dis-
torted interest parity condition it − i∗t − τt + τ∗t − Ėt/Et = 0, we obtain Foreign’s resource constraint:
ȧ∗t = (i
∗
t − τ∗t ) a∗t + P ∗F,tY ∗t − P ∗t C∗t . (C.12)
Expressed in terms of the marginal utility of foreign agents (i.e., normalizing by P ∗t C
∗
t ), noting that
Pt = Eαt and P ∗t = E−αt , the resource constraint is given by
ḃ∗t =
(




b∗t − (C∗t )
−1 (C∗t − S−αt Y ∗t ) ,
for b∗t ≡ a∗t /(P ∗t C∗t ). Substituting Foreign’s Euler equation for the foreign currency bond (C.6) yields
a current account equation given by
ḃ∗t = (ρ+ ζ
∗
t − τ∗t ) b∗t − (C∗t )
−1 (C∗t − S−αt Y ∗t ) .









s−τ∗s )ds (C∗t )
−1 (C∗t − S−αt Y ∗t ) dt.
Using the foreign good’s market clearing condition (C.9), this constraint can be expressed as (11), with
−b∗0 on the left-hand side instead of b0.
Alternatively, expressing (C.12) in terms of the marginal utility of home agents (i.e., normalizing
by PtCt/E), and substituting the home Euler equation for the home bond (C.2) and the interest parity
condition, the current account equation is given by
˙̃








for b̃∗t ≡ a∗tEt/(PtCt). Integrating from 0 to ∞, while imposing a no-Ponzi game condition and using











This version of Foreign’s lifetime budget constraint does not explicitly feature τ∗t , and is therefore more
convenient to work with in setting up the foreign planner’s problem in Appendix A.4.3.
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